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Abstract 
This paper attempts to study the main accounting perspectives regarding emission 
allowances with a special focus on the derived problems of accounting divergence due to 
the lack of specific guidance addressing the accounting issues of this particular area. With 
that purpose, the study will introduce the fundamental accounting issues concerning GHG 
emissions. The current state of both international and some national GAAP (IFRS, U.S. 
and Spanish) related to GHG emissions is discussed below along with the diversity in 
existing practices. This accounting divergence hinders the ability of shareholders, 
regulators and creditors to truly understand the firms´ financial situation since it 
undermines the comparability of financial statements. Therefore, the ultimate goal of this 
report is to show the need for formal accounting guidelines concerning the recognition, 
measurement and disclosure of emission rights, highlighting the significant impact of 
emission gases on firms’ accounting and financial statements. 
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“Accounting For Greenhouse Gases” 
 
1. Introduction 
As a result of the rising concern over climate change around the world, the Kyoto 
Protocol was signed in 1997 with the aim of mitigating global warming the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the signatory countries (Kashyap, Steenkamp & Rahman, 
2011, pp 4). These Greenhouse gas emissions are, among others, one of the pollution 
business activities that have larger social and environmental impact, reflecting a cost 
which is widely known as externatility. It is well known that one way of efficiently reducing 
global emissions, pollution levels and forcing companies to bear a larger part of these 
costs is the creation of cap and trade systems. These facilitate the ability  to put a price on 
gas emissions encouraging them to be cut. Hence, as Aguilar (2011) argues, emission 
trading systems (ETS) limit the firms' ability to produce GHG emissions to the amount of 
emissions rights held and incurring costs if this limit is exceeded, either by paying a fine or 
buying extra credits from other more efficient companies. 
As a result of these reasons the European Union (EU) decided on the creation of the 
so-called European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) as the best instrument to 
achieve this commitment to emissions reduction. The EU Directive on EU ETS transforms 
GHG emissions into a production cost of participating entities thus, making them scarecer 
and giving them value, just like another necessary input factor (capital, labour force). 
Therefore emission allowances have become business rights which bring potential 
benefits to the firm (Andor & Fazekas ,2008). However, the absence of formal accounting 
guidelines regarding the ownership, use and trading of emission allowances results in a 
number of different accounting approaches adopted for market participants which, as 
many authors agree (Ernst&Young, 2009; Kashyap, Steenkamp & Rahman, 2011), 
potentially undermines the comparability of financial statements. 
A  number of key issues arise from this problem. On the one hand, there are several 
possibilities to classificate emission rights as assets, for example, depending of their 
intended use by the firm or regardless of the accounting principles and criteria  of each 
country. On the other hand, focusing on the EU ETS may be found a number of 
accounting  treatments for allowances under the existing IFRS. This regulatory framework 
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provides entities some guidelines to address the asset, liability and possible government 
grant which arise from emissions trading.  However,  it appears to be unable to shake off 
diversity and provide the clear and uniform information required from entities. 
This research focuses on the analysis of the fundamental accounting issues regarding 
GHG emissions from an international perspective. Hence, the purpose of this study is to 
demonstrate the lack of international standards addressing accounting for emission rights 
and to address the problems concerning accounting diversity  as a result of this absence. 
This study finds that the variety of accounting policies adopted by firms can impact their 
financial accounts very differently and make them inconsistent. Thus, the ultimate goal is 
to show the critical need of formal accounting guidelines concerning the recognition, 
measurement and disclosure of emission rights. Bearing in mind the growing prominence 
of emission rights as well as  their significant impact on firms’ financial statements,  the 
present problems involving their accounting treatment offer an interesting case study for 
regulators, investors and creditors who need properly estimate firm’s results. So, the 
research will be developed in several stages: 
First, in order to contextualize the accounting implications of emissions trading, the 
present study starts providing a theory framework involving Greenhouse gases, the Kyoto 
protocol, emission allowances and ETS. So, the paper aims to start providing a reasonable 
understanding of this arised environmental problem as well as the potential and the 
weaknesses of the many key elements which have been created to deal with it.  
In the second section, the paper continues giving a brief overview about the benefits 
of international accounting standards and the initiatives developed by majors accounting 
setting bodies for supporting the harmonization process and financial comparability. This 
overview is a helpful item to reach the main target of the study, which is to address the 
main problems closely linked to the accounting for emission allowances due to the 
absence of international specific guidance. So, the paper follows by analyzing these key 
problems and then moves to highline the accounting and reporting effects of GHG 
emissions on firms’ financial statements.  
As far as accounting issues are concerned, the study reviews the main problems 
related to the classification of emission rights as assets due to their wide variety of 
possible uses. Then, our analysis concentrates on the role of those international and 
domestic financial accounting bodies who have engaged with climate change. So, the 
assignment describes the main regulatory efforts concerning the accounting of emission 
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rights paying special attention to the IFRIC 3 interpretation and the reasons for its main 
mismatches and consequent weaknesses.  
Then, the last section describes the main approaches regarding recognition and 
valuation of emission allowances into the EU ETS, which rely on a combined interpretation 
of the existing IFRS provisions. Finally, some conclusions are drawn related to the main 
aspects of this research. 
 
2. Review Strategy 
To develop this study on the fundamental accounting issues of Greenhouse gas 
emissions I have decided to carry out a detailed review of existing literature by checking 
and comparing data from various sources and economic journals. The research strategy is 
to collect sufficient data to address the study´s main research questions. On the one hand, 
some of the books, papers and studies analyzed have been obtained through a list of 
references that were provided by the tutor of this work. These documents have been found 
using electronic databases or through the library catalogue to find the books available in 
the university library. 
On the other hand, the data collection method uses several strategies focusing 
primarily on economics literature and on electronic resources. The first step consisted of 
seeking information through the databases available online in the library website of the 
University Jaume I. Primarily the information has been identified through specialized 
journals, economics articles, books and working papers via ‘Econlit‘.This journal website 
contains a search engine to search the specific issue by subject. Some of the key search 
terms that were used are ‘accounting for greenhouse gases or emission rights’, ‘cap and 
trade systems’, ‘international accounting standards’, ‘accounting harmonization’ and  
‘Kyoto Protocol’ among others. Secondly, some of the analyzed literature has been found 
through the app Google academics by introducing the adequate key terms in the search 
tool.  
According to the reliability criteria, I have analyzed critically the available material to 
ensure that it is based on verifiable data and is trustworthy. Once verified that the texts can 
be safely used as a resources, distinct methods have been adopted to appropriately 
assess the large amount of information provided by the different sources.  In the first place 
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I started reading the abstract as well as the conclusion to find out if a concrete article 
would be relevant to my work. Then I skimmed the text to identify the principal ideas and 
useful sections of the paper. The next step was to scan the text to extract the specific 
necessary information from the useful sections. The ultimate step was to read intensively 
to make notes on the key points. 
In the first place, the literature review is developed in order to create a conceptual 
framework to define the fundamental items related to the topic (Kyoto protocol, carbon 
emissions, cap and trade systems or emission rights, among others). This theoretical 
conceptualization aims to allow a subsequent greater understanding of the study. In this 
part the data sources were several working papers and websites of regional and 
international organizations and institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change  (DECC), or the European Commission (EC). 
Next, the method is to visit the websites of the main setters of accounting standards  
to obtain reliable data about their efforts towards the harmonization process as well as 
their attempts to provide guidance for accounting emission rights. Furthermore, a review of 
different journal articles and papers dealing with the issue has been carried out. In the next 
phase, the literature review is conducted by assessing how firms are able to choose 
alternatives of emission allowances as assets, showing the different arguments suggested 
for each possible classification due to the continued lack of an authoritative common 
standard. Afterwards, relevant literature on accounting standards is revised in order to 
underline significant regulatory efforts provided by the main accounting standards setters 
to account for gas emissions. 
The research’s accounting practices section was developed by undertaking a 
literature review of secondary sources on the main accounting approaches carried out in 
the EU ETS by firms, in order to truly understand the carbon emissions impact on their 
financial statements.I focused on several accounting practices concerning the recognition, 
measurement and disclosure of emission allowances.The literature mainly emphasizes 
accounting treatments derived from the IFRIC 3 application on a voluntary basis under the 
existing IFRS framework and the allowance consideration as an intangible asset. In this 
section several researches have been found that provide survey results involving 
accounting choices of EU ETS participants, which show the main accounting treatments of 
allowances under this scheme. In this line, all the studies come to the same conclusion: 
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emitters are using a diversity of accounting policies and there is no homogeneous 
treatment for allowances. 
 
3. Greenhouse Gases and the Kyoto Protocol  
Climate change is at present one of the most important environmental problems in the 
world and as Shah (2013) has indicated, it is caused primarily by the increase in 
greenhouse gases (GHG) such as Carbon Dioxide (CO2). Greenhouse gases are air 
pollutants in a gaseous state which act by absorbing thermal radiation from the earth´s 
surface and warming the atmosphere by trapping the heat in it (EIA, 2004).However, it 
should be established from the very outset that, according to the EPA (2007) greenhouse 
effects are naturally occurring over time and are even necessary to support life on earth. 
 However, it can be asserted that the main reason for the problem of climate change is 
human activity, principally the burning of fossil fuels for energy, since they are responsible 
for the increase of air pollution and for the high concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere (Kashyap, Steenkamp & Rahman, 2011). Therefore, the key to global 
warming is that GHGs is responsible for spreading the greenhouse effect, possibly leading 
the planet to dangerous climate change. As Tol (2009) stated “Weather affects agriculture, 
energy use, health and many aspects of nature”. Consequently, climate change might be 
critically destructive to ecosystems and global economies. 
 In response to global concern to constrain average temperatures, due to the increase  
in global warming, the Kyoto Protocol was signed by 175 countries on 11 December 1997 
coming into force on 16 February 2005 (United Nations, 2012). Its ultimate goal is to limit 
climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions around the world.1 From the point 
of view of climate change, it is irrelevant where emissions are reduced, since the effects of 
climate change occur globally and solutions must also be implemented globally. Under the 
Protocol, countries establish their own methods to curb emissions and achieve their 
targets (Domestic Measures). In addition, according to Kashyap, Steenkamp & Rahman 
review (2011),  the Protocol also sets out three innovative market-based mechanisms 
(Flexibility Mechanisms) to motivate green investment and GHG emissions reduction in a 
                                                 
1
 In this regard, the Kioto protocol establishes goals to cut emissions for 37 developed countries 
which must reduce their overall emissions by an average of 5,2% below 1990 levels to the first 
commitment period (to 2008 from 2012) (United Nations, 2012). 
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cost-effective way: international emissions trading systems (ETS), joint implementation (JI) 
and the clean development mechanism (CDM). These three instruments have been 
defined by the United Nations Framework convention on Climate Change as follows 
(United Nations, 2012): 
1. The Joint Implementation mechanism (JI) provides Annex I or industrialized 
countries2 with the opportunity to easily reach their Kyoto targets by investing in 
projects to reduce GHG in other developed economies. In this way, the investing 
country gets additional emission credits by means of Emission Reductions Units 
(ERUs), that they can use to fulfill their Kyoto obligations. On the other hand, the 
host country benefits from investments in clean technologies in its territory. These 
mechanisms are designed for use mainly in  Eastern Europe and the Maghreb. 
2. Another flexibility measure introduced by Kyoto treaty is the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) which allows industrialized countries to buy carbon credits for 
financing emission-reduction projects in developing countries. The target is to 
promote their sustainable development and prevent the increase of global warming. 
As a result, the investment companies obtain emission credits as Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) that allow them to comply with their commitments 
under the protocol . 
Both mechanisms allow investing countries to increase their flexibility to achieve 
their Kyoto targets because one CER or ERU represents an emissions reduction 
equivalent to one tonne of dioxide. As can be seen, the main difference between 
both Kyoto mechanisms is that JI project takes place only between developed 
countries with an emission-limitation target and CDM are realized in developing 
countries which have not adopted legally GHG reduction duties and where 
emission cuts are usually cheaper.  
3. The ultimate measure of the Kyoto protocol is Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS). 
Countries whose emissions are below their reduction target levels (assigned 
amounts) can sell their surplus " allowances " to countries that exceed. So, ETSs 
are markets that have been created to sell and purchase emissions allowances 
(EA) and they are one of the most relevant measures of the policy response to 
Global Climate Change since they offer firms great incentives for carbon reductions 
                                                 
2
 Go to https://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php to see the list of 
Annex I countries under the Kyoto protocol. 
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(Kashyap, Steenkamp & Rahman, 2011).  Moreover, as Souchik (2012)  presumes, 
cap and trade regulations maintain entities more accountable for their negative 
impacts on the environment by forcing them to internalize the costs of pollution 
since they have to pay to pollute over their limits. 
Nowadays, ETS are being extended at both national and international levels and 
they resulting in a direct impact on corporate performance and accounting practice. 
The operation of this relevant measure will be explained in  more detail in the 
following section. 
As we can see, all these flexibility mechanisms turn greenhouse gases into 
marketable products, and even they seem to be innocuous, this may not be true. They 
allow industrialized countries and their companies to buy the right to pollute and not to 
have to meet the minimum commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, consolidating the 
existing inequality between developed and developing countries, regarding the use of the 
atmosphere and natural resources flexibility mechanisms. All low price credits will be held 
in hands of developed countries and when the time arrives for developing countries to 
reduce their own emissions, they  will only be able to access the more expensive options.  
 
4. Carbon Emission Allowances and Emission Trading Systems. 
Carbon Emission Allowances (CEA) or Emissions Allowances (EA) may be defined as 
a new commodity which have been created as a form of emission reduction (United 
Nations, 2012). The Law 13/2010 of 6 July defines them as “licenses or rights to emit an 
equivalent ton of carbon dioxide from an installation during a certain period of time”. 
However, as some views have argued (Giner, 2007, p.177)  these emission rights should 
not be considered as permissions to produce emissions. In actual fact it would be more 
accurate to say that allowances are payment units used by companies in order to meet the 
obligations arising from pollution. Thus, there are two views regarding allowances; they 
may be considered as a right or as a method of payment to fulfill the obligation. 
Emission rights appear with one of the three protocol’s measures: the emission 
trading schemes and cap and trade systems. However, the other protocol mechanisms (JI 
and CDM) also use different Kyoto certificates (ERU and CER) which, in several cases, 
have been recognized as equivalent of CEA in the ETS.  
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In line with the goals of the Kyoto protocol, Emissions trading Schemes (EST) under 
the Cap and Trade systems (as the European Emissions Trading Scheme) allow the 
effective control and reduction of pollution degree and GHG emissions by setting limits on 
total corporations’ emissions for a period of time. To do this, a government entity fixes a 
cap by issuing only a certain amount of tradable emission allowances to achieve the 
wished pollution level. The government will gradually reduce the available EAs each period 
in order to reach desired level of GHG reduction (Elfrink & Ellison, 2009). 
Initially, allowances may be freely allocated from a regulatory body (at no cost or  at a 
cost that is less than fair value) or they also may be sold to specific entities through 
auctions. Then, entities may obtain extra permits through a purchase from other market 
participants. In this regard, emission allowances may be classified into two main groups: 
granted (allocated) emissions allowances and purchased emissions allowances. Each 
credit gives firms the right to achieve a certain volume of emissions during the ordinary 
course of business and total volume of credits cannot exceed the cap, so total firm’s 
emissions are limited by that amount (Mookdee, 2013). Firms that pollute more than their 
rights must  buy allowances from those who pollute less. So, ETS let the entities reduce 
pollution and increase profit, by selling their unneeded rights in the market, or pay an 
additional price and increase expenses, if they wish to increase emissions above their limit 
(Kashyap, Steenkamp & Rahman, 2011). 
When the compliance period is finished, participants have to deliver CEA according to 
their emissions, so if these are higher than their allowances polluters must pay a fine. After 
the regulatory period, emitters can save their unused emission rights to be used in the 
future or they can trade them in the market and make a profit (Souchik, 2012). In this way, 
ETS gives companies a direct financial incentive to curtail their GHG emissions through 
trading, as the buyer has to pay a charge for polluting, while the seller obtains a reward for 
having reduced emissions by more than was needed (European Union, 2009; Deloitte, 
2007). 
According to Bebbington & Larrinaga (2008) there are significant financial implications 
from carbon accounting and reporting for those organizations who are part of cap and 
trade systems. One of the most striking aspects of emission trading markets may be the 
impact on the industrial sector and on the prices of goods and services to consumers. It is 
due to losses and profits resulting from the use and trade of the EA which alter prices and 
has an impact on the company's competitiveness in the primary market. But as Souchik  
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(2012) states, economic activities derived from trading systems, can also have a large-
scale impact on corporate decisions, modifying financial performance and the net worth of 
companies. So, they are able to change long-term company activity. For example a firm 
may increase their investment in technology in order not  to pollute which may be more 
attractive than paying for having pollute. 
A range of multinational, national and regional emission trading schemes have been 
and are now being developed by countries around the world, helping to reduce global 
GHG emissions more cost-effectively,  while in other regions, governments are in the 
process of setting legislations in order to achieve this goal. However, it is interesting to 
focus on the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) which is by far the 
largest and most established scheme in the international carbon market (Kashyap, 
Steenkamp & Rahman, 2011) . From an accounting perspective, it results in different GHG 
accounting practices among the different carbon-emitting entities involved. 
The EU emissions trading system (EU ETS)  became operational in 2005 as a means 
to help the European Union (EU) member states to achieve their global emission reduction 
goal of 8% below 1990 levels. The scheme aims to achieve this EU target in a cost 
effective-way with the purpose of avoiding dangerous climate change. Then, in March 
2007, this reduction’s commitment was reinforced to achieve a reduction level at least 20% 
below 1990 levels3 (Bebbington & Larrinaga, 2008).  
As the British Department of Energy and Climate Change published (DECC, 2012), 
the scheme was established by the 2003/87/EC Directive (2003) of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (EC Directive 2003/87/EC, 2003)4 and it comprises three 
trading phases or “commitment periods”. The first ran from January 2005 to December 
                                                 
3
 The EC Directive 2009/29/EC (2009) aims to start up a set of measures to fulfill the commitment 
assumed by the European Council in March of 2007: to reduce for 2020 the global gas emissions 
of the Community at least 20% below 1990 levels, and a 30% whenever other developed 
countries would make comparable reductions and the more developing advanced countries are 
committed to contribute in function of their responsibilities and capacities. 
4
 Between November of 2008 and April of 2009 were approved two directives which review 
2003/87/CE to reform the European emission trading and widening their scope of application. For 
one, the 2008/101/CE (2008) directive included aviation sector emissions in the Community 
scheme. Meanwhile, the directive 2009/29/EC (2009) reviews Community scheme to harmonize the 
system, to get more benefits, to avoid distortions in the internal market and to facilitate the linking of 
trading. Further, it aims to increase the predictability and expand the scope to new sectors and 
gases. 
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2007, the second from January 2008 to December 2012, at the same time that the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, and the third period started in January 2013 until 
December 2020. Furthermore, these commitment periods are subdivided into “compliance 
periods” in line with the calendar year (from 1 January until 31 December). At the end of 
the first commitment period in phase I, the allowances not delivered became invalid, but 
later in phase II unused rights may be passed on to the next period, which is known as 
banking (Souchik ,2012, p.479). 
In order to start the third phase, the 2003/87/EC Directive was modified by the EC 
Directive 2009/29/EC that introduces a new EU-wide cap on emissions, which will be 
reduced over time. So, with the aim to achieve effectively the EC target to at least 20% 
reduction in gas emission below 1990 levels, the directive established a total reduction of 
allocated allowances of 21% below their 2005 verified emission levels by 2020 (Directive 
2009/29/EC, 2009). Moreover, considerable changes are expected in phase III of the EU 
ETS (2013–2020) that will have implications for financial reporting: the majority of 
allowances will be auctioned rather than granted by the government, harmonization rules 
for the remaining allocations will be introduced and new sector and gases integrated 
(Lovell et al. 2010, p.5). The European Commission (2006) maintains that the scheme 
provides industries a cost-effective form to cut their own emissions with the ultimate 
purpose to allow the EU to reach their reduction target at a cost of below 0.1% of GDP.  
Moreover the scheme also promotes great investments and clean technology to 
developing countries, helping them to hit sustainable development. In 2013, the EU ETS 
covers more than 11.000 heavy- energy consuming  factories,  power plants  and 
commercial aviation,  in all  28 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway and  Liechtenstein.  
Under this scheme, that works on the "cap and trade" principle as in the USA, the 
governments of the EU Member States elaborate National Allocation Plans (NAPs) that 
distribute a precise number of European Union Allowances (EUAs) to each industry. 
Therefore, they fix an emission target, setting caps on the total amount of GHG that can be 
emitted by installations (Mookdee, 2013). 
Firstly, the EUAs are allocated for free or auctioned off to carbon–emitting entities,  
and at the end of the calendar year, these entities must surrender sufficient EUAs to cover 
their annual emissions to the national registry. So, firms that have succeeded in cutting 
emissions can carry their surplus permits over to future years (banking) and can also sell 
them to others in the market (trade). On the other hand, firms that have not sufficient EUAs 
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to match their emissions must buy additional rights in the secondary market if they wish to 
pollute beyond their limit.  
The CDM and the JI are Kyoto mechanisms that allow developed countries to invest in 
emission-saving projects in both developing and developed countries in order to obtain 
credits known as CERs and ERUs which enable companies to fulfill their commitments 
more easily. According to the DECC (2012), the 2004/101/EC Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council recognizes CERs and ERUs as equivalent to EU emission 
allowances, except for those generated by nuclear installations, land use and forestry 
activities. Therefore, it enables JI and CDM investors to use their Kyoto certificates in the 
EU ETS to cover their GHG emissions with the aim of  reaching lower compliance costs. 
 
5. Accounting Divergence, IFRS Benefits and Regulatory Efforts Towards 
Accounting Armonization 
International accounting diversity and the need for financial report harmonization has 
acquired a high importance with the increase of capital markets’ globalization and world-
wide demand for equity capital.  The main issues involving the emissions of Greenhouse 
gases bring us a notable insight from the complexity of classifying and standardizing the 
new problems and impacts arising from climate change. So, this promotes greater 
consideration of the main regulatory efforts of many agencies to harmonise accounting 
practices across countries. 
Despite the above mentioned efforts, it can be said that there is no specific 
international standard or consistent guidance addressing the accounting of emission rights. 
This lack results in a number of different accounting approaches adopted by market 
participants, which as many authors have already argued, undermines the comparability of 
financial statements. In this regard, international accounting standards have demonstrated 
their ability to avoid accounting diversity and protect the stakeholder`s interests (Rülh, 
2011, p.80). Given these concerns, it is widely assumed that accounting harmonization is 
the best method to eliminate the clear diversity in emission rights accounting as a common 
standard regarding emission allowances would allow all emittering firms to account for this 
particular asset in the same way. 
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The accounting harmonization process attempts to form a common set of high-quality 
accounting standards that can be commonly used by all countries around the world, for 
both domestic and cross-border financial reporting (FASB, 2012b; Tarca, 2012; Rülh, 
2011). So, according to Casado (2010) accounting convergence seeks to guarantee 
compliance with the fundamental principles of financial reporting: to protect the interests of 
investors and other stakeholders by giving them reliable information and ensuring the 
comparability of financial reporting across countries.  
The harmonization and convergence efforts developed have led to the publication of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and there is a large amount of 
accounting literature that outlines the benefits from their application (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. The benefits of International Accounting Standards 
In this way, Rülh (2011, p.80) points out that their existence is essential because they 
allow  the improvement of the consistency and comparability between accounting practices 
across countries. As she claims, if each country has their own local accounting standards, 
shareholders and other market participants would require a high knowledge of them to 
Provide  an incentive for the growth of international business 
transactions 
The increase in comparability  reduces costs and improves the 
quality of information and the efficiency of global capital 
markets. 
Gives benefits  and reduces 
costs to companies, auditors, 
accounting managers and the 
remainder  users of financial 
statements 
The higher quality information 
enhances transparency ,stability 
and trust  allowing investors  to 
make  better decisions 
IFRS have the ability to avoid accounting diversity and protect  
stakeholder`s interests 
 They are the most effective 
method to solve the main 
problem regarding greenhouse 
gas emissions allowing emitters 
to account for  this specific 
asset in the same way 
Allow the protection of the 
stakeholder`s interests by giving 
them reliable information and 
ensuring the comparability of 
financial reporting 
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truly understand the firms’ financial situation. Moreover, investors may have difficulty in  
evaluating potential investments and  make successful decisions, if accounting rules differ 
from country to country and there is a lack of comparability of their financial statements. 
According to the Financial Accounting Standard Body (FASB) (2012), another argument in 
support of IFRS benefits is that the increased comparability tends to result in a benefit for 
companies, auditors and remainder users of financial statements since it might both 
reduce costs and increase the effectiveness of global capital markets. 
As Tarca (2012, p.1) argues “When the standards are applied rigorously and 
consistently, capital market participants will have higher quality information and can make 
better decisions”. The quality of information is crucial as it contributes to enhance 
transparency, stability and to create trust because it allows appreciation of  the risks and 
volatility that tend to illustrate market economy  (IFRS, 2013; Rülh, 2011, p.81). 
Therefore,  the ultimate goal of harmonization towards IFRS is to reduce costs for 
multinational corporations who take part in capital markets and to enable investors to 
make easy comparisons between firms making proficient potential investments. 
In this regard, many international, regional and both public and private organizations 
have developed initiatives to international convergence, but these efforts are unlikely to 
shake off accounting diversity. Focusing on the collaborative efforts towards international 
accounting comparability, the activities carried out by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the 
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) can be emphasized. 
The primary international standards-setting body was created  in 1973 as the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and in 2001 it was restructured into 
IASB  (FASB, 2012). The IASB is currently operating under the oversight of IFRS 
Foundation. It is an independent standard-setting board responsible for the elaboration 
and publication of International Accounting Standards (Deloitte, n.d) 5. 
These standards consist of: 
 International Accounting Standards (IASs). IASs which were issued by the 
IASC, predecessor of  IASB till 2000. 
                                                 
5
 See http://www.iasplus.com/en/resources/regional 
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 Standards Interpretations Committee (SICs). SIC were standards 
interpretations issued by the Standards Interpretations Committee, 
predecessor of IFRIC till 2002. 
 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). IFRS are the current 
global standards  issued by the IASB. 
 International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRICs). 
IFRICs are standards interpretations issued by the International Financial 
Reporting Interpretations Committee6. 
Since the IASB creation, there has been a progressive adoption of international 
standards and many countries are currently developing a set of changes in their regulatory 
systems toward accounting harmonization, especially the United States (US), the EU and 
others such as Japan and China. So, in 2013 more than 120 countries require or allow 
entities IASB standards or a local adaptation of them (IFRS, 2013; Rülh, 2011).  
Another significant body related to international standards is the FASB; In this regard, 
it is relevant the convergence progress between United States Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (US GAAP) and IFRS. Since 2002, the FASB and IASB have been 
working together to improve both standards and make them compatible (FASB, 2012a). As 
Paul & Burks (2010) mention, the main goal of their agreement is to create a set of high 
quality standards in order to reduce differences and costs, increase efficiency and allow 
shareholders to make well informed decisions. On the one hand, the Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC)7 has contributed to accelerate the conversion from US GAAP to IFRS 
since 2007 when it allowed all US public firms to apply IFRS instead the local standards. 
On the other hand, this convergence program allows FASB to participate in the IASB’s 
decision making process.Thus, as Sanz Santolaria (1996) states, that fact explains the 
existence of a large worldwide impact of FASB standards on the accounting practices of 
                                                 
6
 The IFRS Interpretations Committee (the ‘Interpretations Committee’) is the interpretative body of 
the IASB. Both are responsible for the maintenance of IFRS. It has played an important role 
interpreting the standards dealing with emissions allowances to decrease diversity in accounting 
practices. 
7 
The  SEC is the regulatory agency of the US responsible for enforcing security federal law and 
ensuring a  fair and efficient nation’s stock market with the aim to protect  investors. See 
http://www.sec.gov.ph/aboutsec/history.html 
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different countries throughout the use of IFRS. So, he argues that the IASB tends to 
evolve towards the American system. 
Focusing on the EU, the EFRAG also moves towards the convergence and makes 
efforts to ensure consistency between community directives and IASB international 
standards. For this reason, since 2005 all country members of the EU have claimed that 
IAS/IFRS adopted by the EU are required in consolidated accounts for listed companies 
and Banks. Moreover, international standards can be required for both consolidated or 
individual financial reports of no listed companies (R (EU)  nº 1606/2002/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, of 19 July 2002). 
However, international standards are not directly applied in the EU as they are issued, 
but they are required to consult the EFRAG who is responsible for ensuring that standards 
meet the fair view and the understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability criteria. 
So, EFRAG’s recommendation may be an acceptance of standards, recommendations for 
change or a rejection.  
 
6. The Lack Of Specific International Accounting Guidance for Emission 
Allowances  
The fundamental item of cap and trade schemes and the control of environmental 
pollution are emissions rights; they are emitted, allocated, used and traded in ETS and 
they produce an important impact on firms’ accounting and financial statements. For that 
reason, emission allowances must necessarily be measured and reported on firms’ 
accounts so that effects can be monitored by their regulators, shareholders and creditors. 
Currently, accounting for emissions allowances is regulated by IAS 38 (Intangible 
Assets), IAS 20 (Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government 
Assistance), IAS 37 (Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets) and IAS 36 
(Impairment of Assets). But, although there are some international accounting standards 
that can be applied to allowances it is a well-known problem that there is no specific 
international accounting standard regarding recognition and measurement of emission 
rights and also official guidance is quite inconsistent.  
So, companies involved in ETS, who are required to prepare financial statements 
according to IAS/IFRS standards, can make their suitable accounting methods based on 
generally available principles, on experts’ interpretations or in their own judgment 
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(Mookdee, 2013).  In this sense, the  IFRS conceptual framework, according to paragraph 
10 of IAS 8 ‘Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors’, indicates 
(Deloitte, 2010; Lovell et al., 2010 ) : 
“In the absence of a Standard or an Interpretation that specifically applies to a 
transaction, management must use its judgement in developing and applying 
an accounting policy that results in information that is relevant and reliable. In 
making the judgement, management shall consider the applicability of, the 
following sources in descending order: 
(a) The requirements and guidance in Standards and Interpretations dealing 
with similar and related issues; and 
(b) The definitions, recognition criteria and measurement concepts for assets, 
liabilities, income and expenses in the Framework." 
Consequently, a number of different and woolly  accounting approaches are being 
adopted for market participants in order to account for their emissions. First of all, this 
accounting flexibility and derived diversity threatens the comparability of financial 
statements, (Ernst&Young, 2009; Fornaro, Winkelman & Glodstein, 2009; Kashyap, 
Steenkamp & Rahman, 2011) and may also give rise to volatility and often contradictory 
effects on recognition of assets, liabilities, incomes and expenses (KPMG, 2008). That 
point can be illustrated by previous research carried out by Pricewaterhouse and the 
International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) during 2007 which found six main 
accounting practices and several variations used by the 26 firms analyzed in the treatment 
of allowances (Elfrink & Ellison, 2009). On the other hand, as  Giner (2007, p.175) 
indicates, not all of the different accounting policies adopted by ETS participants are 
consistent with the IASB Framework and other existing IFRS related to the topic. 
Therefore, an important and often controversial problem at the heart of ETS is the 
inconsistency of market participants’ financial reporting implying that formal guidelines as 
to how to recognize, measure and disclose emission allowances, are urgently required. As 
Kashyap, Steenkamp & Rahman (2011) and Mookdee (2013) suggest, the need for 
common accounting treatments for EA are principally necessary to allow investors to 
properly estimate the impact of carbon emission reductions on a firm´s financial 
performance and value, in order to make appropriate investment decisions. But apart from 
investors, it is essential that the use and trading of EA can be monitored by creditors and 
all the remainder stakeholders related with the entity, because the alternative accounting 
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treatments truly impact on profit and loss, financial position as well as profitability and 
leverage ratios of firms. Incidentally, given the direct and immediate impact of EA on 
company profits, accounting treatments also affect the interests of the government in 
connection with the estimation of tax expense. (Giner Inchausti, 2007). 
Likewise, besides polluters, there are other market participants who also need EAs 
accounting standards to support accurate financial reporting. For example, brokers and 
non polluters trade EAs as investments in the secondary markets; furthermore, companies 
exist which pretend to reduce pollution carrying out innovative projects to achieve credits 
that then can be sold to over-polluters. 
As Souchik (2012, p.495) points out, another problem concerning the inconsistency of 
financial reporting of EAs is the loss of opportunity related to market participant’s inability 
to press companies to reduce their emissions. When companies use different accounting 
methods and do not present transparent information, it is harder for market participants to 
compare them and to identify those who have purchased EA beyond their cap or paid fines 
in contrast with those who have successfully achieved larger emission reductions. 
 In this way, Souchik (2012, p. 500) highlights some possible benefits of an accurate 
accounting report and the existence of uniform measurement standards. Principally, it 
creates more accountable firms to the investing public and could pressurize firms to 
internalize the pollution costs; apart from this, it provides a stimulus for investment in more 
sustainable production methods to achieve larger emissions reductions and get profits 
through trading, lower emission expenses or avoiding fines. So, the author textually 
concludes: “Requiring companies to accurately account for emissions trading is one of the 
best ways to ensure true compliance with any cap-and-trade system”. 
Figure 2 shows all the above mentioned problems due to the diversity of accounting 
practices. 
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Figure 2: Main problems arising from the absence of specific international guidance for GHG 
 
But, beyond all of those problems an empirical study on accounting policies of 75 UK 
participants in the EU ETS (Kashyap, Steenkamp & Rahman, 2011) have found that there 
are a considerable number of companies (76%) which do not report their accounting 
practices although they disclose some additional information about emission allowances 
through tables, narratives and graphs. Additionally, some holder entities present 
accounting information only about the received free allocations  and  for the sale of these 
credits, but not when allowances are purchased, surrendered and inventoried. 
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7. Issues around Classification and Recognition of Emission Allowances  
Emission trading schemes have raised the discussion about how to recognize EAs as 
assets as well as the obligation to surrender allowances as liabilities. Whereas it is broadly 
asserted that emission rights meet the definition of an asset (they are resources controlled 
as a result of past events and they are able to provide future economic benefits to the firm), 
according to Lovell et al. (2010, 2013) they are hard to classify because they have a wide 
range of applications (as an inventory, a currency, an intangible asset, a financial 
instrument and so on) so, standard setters and accounting practitioners in the EU ETS are 
trying to deal with this complexity. 
Although the different recognition and measurement practices regarding EA will be 
detailed later, the possible classification of emission allowances as an asset that entities 
can carry out is just one significant aspect of the subject that must also be considered. 
Emission allowances are mainly acknowledged  as a specific class of intangible asset 
which must be measured at fair value with the following revaluation recognition in the 
income statement (Ratnatunga, 2007). However, as the EFRAG (2013) considers it can be 
suggested that the most suitable accounting treatment of allowances have to be 
determined depending on the business objective of the activity and the expected use of 
allowances by the company. This approach is known as Business model. Related to it, the 
firms are able to account this particular type of asset in different ways, depending on 
whether they are held: 
- For sale in the ordinary course of business to get benefits from short-term 
changes in prices (trading business model) or  
- For consuming them in the production process being delivered to the 
government to fulfill their obligation (production business model).  
Therefore, currently companies in the international arena can use the existing IFRS 
framework and apply different recognition principles to account this asset, depending on its 
use (Autorité des Normes Comptables, 2012, p.10). In this regard, authors such as  Elfrink 
& Ellison (2009),  Ratnatunga (2007) and Deloitte (2007) underline the most common 
considerations of allowances as assets: 
As Intangible assets: In line with the IFRIC 3 approach, all classes of allowances 
should be treated as intangible assets. Furthermore, granted allowances must be 
recognized as a government grant on the date of the granting for the difference between 
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the price of the rights and its fair value and classified as a deferred income in the balance 
sheet with a subsequent derecognition in profit and loss on a systematic basis, as 
emissions are made. 
As inventory: Allowances are recognized as an inventory and measured at historical 
cost under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) guidelines, when they are held 
for production activity since they are considered as the required costs to settle the 
environmental commitments and comply with emissions reduction schemes. However, if 
they are held for trading purposes, they must be classified as other investments. On the 
other hand, the Institute of Accounting and Auditing (ICAC, 2013)8 supports classifying 
allowances held for trading as inventories and maintains that they must to be carried at 
cost. 
As financial assets: An argument in support of this approach is that allowances are 
assets that have no physical substance and can be bought and sold in the market so they 
can be readily converted to cash. Therefore, when EAs are expected to be traded, they 
have to be classified as financial assets and measured at fair value with gains and losses 
recognized directly in income. In this regard, Andor & Fazekas (2008) maintain that EAs 
should be classified under IFRS 5 Non Current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued 
Operations as long as their book value would be intended to be retrieved by a sale rather 
than by continued use in the company. Even so, as it has been seen, the IFRIC approach 
treats all types of allowances as intangibles regardless of intended use for productive or 
trading purposes. Moreover, when rights are held for trading, they are classified as other 
investments under the FERC approach and as inventories under the Spanish accounting 
(ICAC, 2013,) but not as financial instruments. 
As derivatives: In addition to emission allowances, the participants of cap and trade 
systems are able to execute forward contracts in order to purchase their rights in the future 
as a fixed price. According to Haupt & Ismer (2011, p.10), these purchase contracts can 
be treated as derivatives under the IAS 39  by accounting for them as a cash flow hedge 
and reporting the changes in their fair value in other comprehensive income. 
As Elfrink & Ellison (2009) noted,  the expected use of the allowances in the company 
will determine the impact on the cash flow statement. So under the FERC historical 
                                                 
8
 The ICAC Resolution on May 2013 establishes that the allowances nature depends on its 
intended use by the company and treats them as an intangible asset if used for operational 
purposes and as inventories if used for trading purposes. 
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approach (under which assets are classified as inventories, except for trading purposes), 
the granted allowances are recorded at nil so there is no cash flow impact. Meanwhile, 
purchased rights are valued at cost and their value changes  will be recorded in the 
operating section of the cash flow statement (operating purposes) or in the investing 
section (trading purposes). On the other hand,  under the IFRIC 3 approach the 
allowances are intangibles so their changes should appear in the investing section. 
Nevertheless, some authors and organizations (Autorité des Normes Comptables, 
2012, p.8) consider that the different practices to account for EA according to the firms’ 
use, results in considerable inconsistency of financial statements that could be avoided 
through a common standard which allows a general and homogeneous treatment of this 
new commodity. 
 
8. Regulatory Efforts Regarding Emissions Allowances Accounting  
In response to the absence of specific standards or comprehensive guidelines on 
accounting for EA, the IASB, the FASB, and other financial accounting standards setting 
bodies have developed different interpretations and guidelines according to cap and trade 
systems and how the emission rights must be identificated, valued and disclosed. 
 
8.1. The International Accounting Standards Board Effort: Lights and 
Shadows of the IFRIC 3. 
From an international perspective, one of the most relevant regulatory efforts on 
emission rights accounting has been the IFRIC 3 interpretation “Emission Rights”. It was 
issued by the IASB’s Interpretations Committee in December 2004 prior to the coming of 
the EU ETS with the aim of giving guidance to existing IFRS in view of the divergent 
practices emerged from EA accounting. 
The IFRS Interpretations Committee is the interpretative body of the IASB. The types 
of issues that the Interpretations Committee is called on to deal with include the 
identification of divergent practices that have emerged for accounting for particular 
transactions, cases of doubt about the appropriate accounting treatment for a particular 
circumstance or concerns expressed by investors about poorly specified disclosure 
requirements. 
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The main characteristics of the IFRIC 3 were: 
 A cap and trade scheme,  give rise to an (1) asset for allowances held, a (2) 
government grant for the permits granted for less than their fair value and a (3) 
liability for the obligation to surrender allowances equal to emissions that have 
been made. 
 Allowances, whether allocated by government or purchased, are intangible 
assets that should be initially recognized in accordance with IAS 38  and they 
can be initially measured at acquisition cost when they are both purchased and 
auctioned, or at their market value when they are allocated free of charge. 
 When allowances are allocated by the government for less than their fair value, 
they are initially measured at their fair value, with the difference between the 
payment and their fair value (their market price) as a government grant that 
must be accounted for according with IAS 20. 
The grant of allowances is recognized as deferred income in the balance sheet 
and should be systematically released to income over the compliance period as 
emissions are made. 
 As a participant produces emissions, it recognizes a provision for its obligation 
to remit allowances in accordance with IAS 37. This provision should be 
measured at the best estimate of the expenditure needed to settle the 
obligation (that  will usually be the present market value of all rights required to 
cover the emissions made at the end of the reporting period). The derived 
expenses are recognized in profit and loss as well as the possible changes in 
the value of the obligation. 
  If it is likely that allowances may be impaired, they must be measured for 
impairment according to IAS 36. 
However, the content of this interpretation was questioned, especially in the EU 
countries where the EFRAG did not recommend its adoption and issued a negative 
endorsement advice (Deloitte, 2009). According to Giner Inchausti (2007, p.185), the 
EFRAG agreed with the individual recognition of the asset and the liability instead of 
offsetting them, because both elements meet the IASB Framework’s definitions and exist 
independently. 
Therefore, according to Bebbington & Larrinaga (2008), the rejection was mainly due 
to the mismatches from the measurement of assets and liabilities with different valuation 
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bases and its consequent impact on the income statement. The main criticisms were about 
the cost model which implies a measurement mismatch through the valuation of assets 
(allowances) at cost and liabilities (provisions) at fair value. The EFRAG (2005) suggests 
that these gaps are vital given the economic interdependency between asset and liability 
in the scheme: it considers illogical that the liability is measured at a different amount than 
the allowances which are the only assets that can be held to extinguish it. Regarding the 
revaluation model9, there is no measurement mismatch between asset and liability as both 
are valued at current value, but there is a location mismatch which creates great volatility 
as it implies the recognition of intangible’s revaluations directly in equity (in accordance 
with IAS 38) and the record of liability’s changes in profit and loss (according with IAS 37). 
Meanwhile, EFRAG considered that this mismatch results in artificial income shifts and it 
suggests that both the gains and the losses should be recognized in the Income Statement 
to provide a real accounting result (Lovell et al., 2010; Haupt & Ismer, 2011). 
Furthermore, Ernst&Young (2009) also consider a timing mismatch that emerges 
because allowances are recorded when they are received, normally at the beginning of the 
calendar year while liability is recognized along the calendar year as emissions are made. 
With those mismatches in mind, the EFRAG believed that the use of IFRIC 3 does not 
provide useful information because it might often not reflect the economic reality, so it 
even asserted that IFRIC was contrary to the fair principle. This failure alongside the 
pressure from the European Commission, led IASB to withdraw the IFRIC 3 in June 2005 
(Lovell et al., 2010, p.15) 
According to the IASB (2005, p.1), despite the mentioned withdrawal, IASB members 
considered that IFRIC 3 provided a correct interpretation of existing standards. However, it 
was because of the imminent start of the EU ETS, they deemed a critical necessity for an 
interpretation, but then the IFRS was not considered as urgent because trading markets 
were still limited. So, the Board decided to carry out a more comprehensive assessment of 
the mismatches from IFRIC application and to improve current standards to eliminate 
those volatilities. In this regard, in December 2007, the IASB added to its agenda a project 
                                                 
9
 Under the Revaluation model allowances shall be revaluated in line with their market value at the 
date of the revaluation less any accumulated impairment losses. It implies recognizing value gains 
in other comprehensive income (equity) and value losses in profit or loss, except in the event of 
reversals, in which case the subsequent gain or loss will be registered in the same place that the 
previous value change. So, the asset has the same measurement than the liability as both are 
carried them at a revalued amount.. 
 29 
 
to address key issues regarding EA accounting, which did not set out to result in a new 
IFRS, but it claims to address the issues by revising the IAS 38, IAS 39 and IAS 20.  
Later, the FASB discussed its joint project with the IASB on ETS in its April 2009 
meeting wherein they considered an accounting guideline for Cap and Trade Systems as 
well as project based and renewable energy certificates. Later, in November 2010, both 
setters decided to defer their joint project, which then was reactivated as an IASB-only 
research project as part of its agenda consultation 2011 (KPMG, 2010; Deloitte, 2009). 
 
8.2. National Regulatory Efforts: US and Spanish GAAP 
8.2.1 US efforts: The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission guidelines  
Focusing on United States, all listed U.S. firms have to apply Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), promulgated by the FASB under the authority of the SEC. 
In recent years, the increased importance of accounting harmonization has resulted in 
efforts to align GAAP with the IFRS. However, neither IFRS nor GAAP provides clear 
guidance on accounting for emission allowances, so companies disclose greenhouse 
gases on various treatments with a basis between IFRS and US GAAP standards 
(Souchik, 2012; Fornaro, Winkelman & Goldstein, 2009). In November 2003, the FASB 
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF 10 )issued the EITF Issue 03-14, Participants’ 
Accounting for Emissions Allowance under a “Cap and Trade” Program in order to provide 
guidance for utilities and other energy companies to account for their emissions.The EITF 
considered that the asset classification depends on the expected use of rights by the entity 
so, they may be classified as inventory or intangible assets when they are held for 
operational purposes but as a financial assets if they are owned in order to  trade them. 
Nevertheless, this guidance was failed and removed early (EITF, 2013). 
                                                 
10
 The EITF was created in 1984 by the FASB with the aim of helping it to improve financial 
reporting guidelines and to resolve the identified accounting issues throughout public meetings. It 
must help to comply with the FASB Accounting Standards Codification TM framework and has to 
elaborate guidelines within this framework  to avoid  accounting diversity (EITF, 2003). 
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According to FASB(2014), The FERC11 is currently the single organization which has 
made efforts for accounting guidance on EA. So, FERC guidelines are the only specific 
guidance about emission allowances in the US and as it thinks, the major US companies 
account their EA applying FERC inventory model. According to Deloitte (2007) this method 
involves recording EA as inventory (or as other investments if they are held for trading 
purposes) on a historical cost approach (it means that rights are measured at their initial 
cost, usually close to zero) and record the derived expense as emissions are made with a 
weighted-average cost basis. However, as Ernst and Young (2010) have underlined there      
are other firms that use alternative accounting approaches, for example, recognizing EA 
as an intangible asset under the intangible asset model. 
As Lovell et al. (2010, p.16) explains, US companies that hold their rights for 
compliance as a key element of their productive activity, do usually use inventory model 
while those which keep allowances for trading purposes or as a result of investment 
projects tend to choose intangible asset model. 
This accounting practices diversity highlights the inconsistency among US entities’ 
financial reporting and also shows that entities are confused as they do not have specific 
advice about suitable accounting. The lack of specific accounting rules, brings various 
disadvantages such as the consequent difficulty of comparing firms’ financial statements 
as well as their performance and value and the possible costs of investing time and 
resources to choose the most adequate accounting treatment for allowances. However, 
this flexibility also gives companies the advantage of choosing the simplest accounting 
practice (Lovell et al, 2010, p.6). 
 
8.2.2 The Spanish perspective: The ICAC Standard 
The Accounting Standard Setters of many European countries such as Spain, are 
required to issue specific guidance concerning the accounting for emission allowances 
through their national regulations. These guidelines are needed to elaborate firms’ 
individual financial statements as well as consolidated statements for unlisted firms which 
are subject to national accounting regulations instead of the IFRS. In this regard, some 
                                                 
11
 The FERC is a regulator of energy utilities in US. Since 1993 it has required electric public utilities 
and other energy companies into its jurisdiction to elaborate their accounts in line with the 
Comission’s Uniform System of Accounts (USofA). So, the USofA are today the only emission 
allowances accounting  guidelines within US GAAP  (FERC, 2010). 
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European countries have developed their own local guidelines based on different foreign 
accounting approaches such as the IFRIC 3 or US perspectives which are often not in line 
with the requirements of the IFRS framework. 
For instance, in the case of Spain, the ICAC issued a resolution in February 2006 
(ICAC 2006 GHG) to address the accounting for emission rights which was developed with 
a wide focus on IFRIC 3 approach. So, as Giner (2007, p.188) points out the treatment of 
the asset12 and the grant13  are in line with the IFRS principles (IAS 38 and IAS 20). 
However, the IFRIC 3 and the Spanish approach differ on the accounting for provisions. 
They agree that the expenses and consequent liability which should be recognized as 
emissions are made, but according to Lovell et al. (2010), in the Spanish case, it is the 
measurement of these items which do not agree with the general requirements established 
in IAS 37 for measuring provisions. This is because Spanish regulation requires the 
provision to be measured not at fair value of any allowances, but at a mixed value based 
on the carrying value of the held rights14 as well as on the market value of the rights that 
will have to be bought to cover actual emissions, that it is the best estimation of the 
amount necessary to cover the shortfall in rights.  
Table 1 summarizes the main similarities and differences between the IFRIC 3 
approach and Spanish guidelines to recognize and measure the essential elements arising 
from the accounting for greenhouse gases (asset, liability, government grant, expenses 
and revenues, etc.). 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Under the IFRS framework the allowances are intangible assets that can be valued at cost 
(purchased or auctioned) or at fair value (granted) and in this latter case the value changes are 
reflected directly in equity and not in the income statement (Giner, 2007). 
13
 The government grant is recognized for the difference between the payment for rights and their 
fair value, as a deferred income in the balance sheet with a subsequent de-recognision in income 
on a systematic basis as emissions are made and as expenses are also registered. 
14
 The liability is measured firstly at market value of granted rights and secondly by the acquisition 
cost of additional rights purchased in order to fulfill the verified emissions at year end. Further a 
provision must include the best estimation of the allowances that have to be purchased to cover the 
shortfall of verified rights.Is important that as rights are required to be depreciated the liability 
measurement could be affected for these possible value changes. 
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Table 1: Main similarities and differences between IFRIC 3 and Spanish resolution of 2006 
 
IFRIC 3  Spanish regulation (ICAC 2006) 
SIMILARITIES 
Initial recognition 
Initial measurement of allowances: 
A. Purchased: as intangible assets at acquisition cost  
B. Granted: as intangible assets at market value, a government grant is 
also recognised and allocated as revenues on a systematic basis as 
emissions are made. 
Timing of Liability 
recognition  
Expenses and subsequent liability recognition as emissions are realized along 
the commitment period. 
DIFFERENCES 
Liability measurement 
At fair value of any type 
of allowances held, both 
purchased and allocated 
▪ A provision should be recognised at the 
carrying value of total allowances available to 
fulfil the obligation 
▪ When held allowances are not enough to settle 
the provision, the company should also 
account for the additional allowances required 
to cover the shortfall at a market value; 
▪ The provision should be increased if possible to 
incur a potential penalty for no compliance. 
 
Despite the explained ICAC resolution, the body was forced to approve a later 
resolution on May 2013 due to the changes introduced by the EC Directive 2009/29/EC 
(2009) on the trading scheme emissions, which suggests a community approach; in 
particular, national allocation plans are missing and a new method of allocating allowances 
is established whereby rights become largely allocated by auction rather than free 
allocation from 2013. 
So, with the continuous absence of specific international standards, the new resolution 
establishes criteria for the recognition of rights, which are based on the business model 
and the expected use of rights within companies. Therefore, according to the ICAC 
standard (ICAC, 2013) the sixth standard on intangible assets, under subsection eight 
assumes that the emission rights allocated or purchased to be used in the production 
process of the company or those with an undetermined future use, will be classified as 
intangible assets. On the other hand, those rights acquired to be sold are accounted as 
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inventories  meanwhile the accounting for future contracts to receive or deliver rights will 
be provided  in the standard of financial  instruments. 
The resolution specifically focuses on the recognition and valuation principles 
concerning allowances as intangible assets. So, the main criteria are the following: 
Asset initial valuation: The allowances are initially valued at their acquisition cost 
which would be the market value for the allocated rights and the purchase price for the 
purchased rights. However, for granted allowances allocated free or charge or for less 
than their fair value an income will be recognized directly in equity with a systematic 
allocation in profit and loss as expenses are registered for the emissions associated with 
the granted rights.15 
Asset subsequent measurement: Even though emission rights are intangible assets 
they will not be amortized. Instead, if allowances are carried at more than their recoverable 
value (the higher of its fair value less selling costs and it value in use), their impairment 
losses have to be recognized in the income statement. Further, the allowances cannot be 
revalued according to the Spanish GAAP. The allowances will be derecognized when they 
are traded, delivered or expired. 
Liability recognition and measurement: They will be recognized as an expense and as 
a subsequent provision in line with emission made. The provision is justified because it 
exists as a clear expense, but it has an undetermined amount at the closing date. The 
provision and the intangible assets will exist since the company has to pay off the 
obligation by delivering the allowances in the next accounting period.The amount of the 
expenses and the obligation will be determined considering the carrying value of the rights 
held. A FIFO valuation for the expenses and the primary liability is applied, which are 
measured at book value of granted allowances (their market value on the allocation date). 
Then, the additional obligation is measured at the average costs of extra rights that have 
been later purchased to cover the firm’ emissions. Furthermore, if the emissions exceed all 
the rights, allocated or purchased, there is a deficit which must be measured as an added 
expense and liability, according to the best possible estimate of the amount required to 
cover the shortfall in rights at the balance sheet date (ICAC, 2013). Additionally, the 
regulation requires the recognition of impairment losses for any allowances owned, both 
                                                 
15
 This treatment differs from the previous ICAC resolution in which granted allowances leaded not 
to a income directly recognized in equity but to a government grant recognision with the 
subsequent systematic derecognision as income as emissions were realized (ICAC 2006). 
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assigned and purchased. This affects the liability valuation since it is measured at book 
value of the rights held and expected to be purchased.  
Sale of allowances: During the next compliance period, the firm can sell their surplus 
allowances on the market. This sale will generate losses or profits from intangible assets 
for the difference between their book value and the amount received less costs to sell 
which must be recognized in profit and loss statement. 
In appendix A, a table comparing the different EA accounting practices for the last two 
Spanish guidelines shows the main differences related to allocation of allowances by the 
government, purchase of allowances, possible impairment of allowances, recognition of 
the liability and expense, recognition of income for the grant, sale of allowances and 
delivery of them. 
Having examined this specific Spanish guidance concerning emission rights, the main  
consideration is that this national regulation is only applicable to elaborate individual and 
consolidated annual reports for Spanish unlisted companies. However, Spanish listed 
companies who operate on EU ETS are subject to the IASB general framework 
(Fernández Cuesta, Moneva & Larrinaga, 2006). So, the key concern derives from the 
possibility that listed companies who are required to apply IFRS, can apply local guidelines 
which, as have already been shown, do not always agree with the principles of IFRS 
standards. 
An illustration of diversity of accounting treatments in this area and the consequences 
of the diverse accounting practices on the financial statements that have emerged globally 
can be seen in Fornaro, Winkelman & Glodstein (2009). They analyze the diverse 
accounting practices for GHG emissions presently being used and the conflicting financial 
results taking a hypothetic company as a reference. The analysis highlights the lack of 
comparability among companies globally and the questionable relevance of financial 
information provided to users (See Figure 3). 
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Source: Fornaro, Winkelman  & Glodstein (2009) 
Figure 3: Illustration of global accounting diversity 
 
9. Alternative Accounting Treatments of Emission Rights under the EU ETS  
The absence of a specific standard accounting for emission rights has given rise to 
numerous accounting policies available in practice which rely on a combined interpretation 
of existing IFRS provisions . Firstly, several accounting practices will be shown which have 
been suggested to eliminate the weaknesses of existing standards with specific attention 
to the repealed IFRIC 3 mainly due to its measurement mismatch. Then, the paper will 
focus on the analysis of the different accounting practices that firms carry out into the EU 
ETS under the allowances consideration as intangible assets. 
 
9.1. Suggested Accounting Treatments to Eliminate Main IFRIC 3 
Mismatches of  Accounting for  Emission Rights. 
Given the critical mismatches of the IFRIC 3 and the lack of accounting guidance for 
the EU ETS transactions, some alternative account treatments have been suggested, 
aimed at getting a common valuation basis for the asset and the liability (Giner Inchausti , 
2007, p.186-187). 
1. The main solution is backed by the IFRIC under the revaluation model. It implies to  
create a specific category of intangible assets whose revaluation gains were 
recognized in profit and loss. However, it would mean obtaining incomes during the 
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allocation period, because revaluations would affect all the held allowances, while 
the provision and the consequent expenses would be registered as emissions were 
made. 
2. The second treatment is proposed by the EFRAG also under the revaluation model 
and implies that the allowances maintained to settle emissions provisionally 
recognizes their value changes in equity until emissions were made when these 
changes would be incorporated in profit and loss. In this way, the provision 
expenses would be offset and there is no results along the allocation period. 
3. The third alternative is in line with the ICAC (ICAC 2006 and 2013) proposal and 
maintains that under the cost model for the valuation of assets, a solution is to 
recognize the obligation at the book value of the allowances that remain to be used 
as payment. Therefore, the valuation is mixed as based on the carrying value of 
the held rights, already granted or purchased,  and on the market value of those 
that still have to be purchased to cover actual emissions. The problem is that this 
treatment fails to incorporate the real value of emissions, so externalities are not 
fully  internalized. 
So far, several suggested accounting practices have been examined in order to 
eliminate the main mismatches of the IFRIC 3 interpretation. Keeping this in mind, the 
paper now moves to consider the main accounting practices into the EU ETS with a basis 
on the existing IFRS framework. 
 
9.2. Divergence in Accounting Practice  under the Scope of the Existing 
IFRS Framework Related to EA Accounting. 
The withdrawal of IFRIC 3 and the subsequent absence of particular guidelines 
addressing the accounting for emission rights, gave entities participating in an EU ETS, a 
greater flexibility to choose the appropriate accounting treatment of their allowances. Then, 
according to Ernst&Young (2009) and Andor & Fazekas (2008), a range of accounting 
practices may be identified related to the IFRIC 3 application on a voluntary basis, under 
the scope of the following existing IFRS framework related to the topic: 
IAS 20 – Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government 
Assistance 
IAS 36 – Impairment of Assets 
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IAS 37 – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets 
IAS 38 – Intangible Assets 
IFRS 5 – Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations. 
The main accounting practices adopted by larger entities under the EU ETS may be 
examined as follows:  
 
a) Initial asset recognition 
Due to the predominant classification of allowances as intangible assets under IAS 38, 
some researchs (Ernst&Young 2009; Haupt & Ismer 2011; Dellaportas 2008) has noted 
that the main approaches can be classified into two groups: the net liability approach, 
which tends to prevail in Europe, and the government grant approach. Both approaches 
recognize either allowances purchased in the market or by auctioning at cost (purchase 
price). So, the approaches differ in the treatment of granted allowances. 
A. The net liability approach recognizes the rights granted by the government at cost 
or nominal amount (nil) and implies only recognizing a liability once emissions 
made are larger than the allocated rights still held to settle the obligation. As 
granted rights are not recorded as assets, they are not included as a part of the 
liability and expenditure. So, according to the reliability criteria of IFRS framework, 
it is the main weakness of this method because recognizing the rights at nil, fails to 
reflect their economic value. Furthermore, as Haupt & Ismer (2011, p.7) pointed 
out, this approach has the inconvenience of the heterogeneous treatment of 
allowances because those which are purchased are recorded on the balance sheet 
while those that are granted are not.  
B. Under the government grant approach, granted allowances are recognized initially 
at their fair value. Additionally, a government grant is also recognized for the 
difference between the fair value of the allocated rights and the price paid for them, 
as a deferred income in the balance sheet with a subsequent de-recognition as 
income on a systematic basis over the compliance period. It is a measurement in 
line with IFRIC 3 but, regarding liability, companies do not measure their obligation 
to surrender allowances at fair value, but on a ‘cost with the balance at market 
value’ basis, that is, the liability is measured at the carrying value of those 
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allowances already granted or purchased , and at the market value of the rights 
that still have to be purchased to cover actual emissions. 
 
b) Subsequent asset measurement 
Haupt & Ismer  (2011, p.7-8) found two measurement models for emission allowances 
that are classified as intangible assets (IAS 38), regardless of the initial treatment of 
granted allowances at cost or fair value. 
A. The cost model implies measuring rights at book value, that is, at the initial cost 
registered under net liability (nil) or government grant approach (fair value) less any 
accumulated impairment losses, and not reflecting potential value gains. Although 
impairment losses must be registered in the profit and loss it is common that they 
are not reflected because in practice, allowances tend to be tested for impairment 
as part of a cash generating unit (which only recognizes an impairment if the entire 
CGU’s fair value decreases).  
B. The revaluation model requires the allowances revaluation in line with their market 
value at the date of the revaluation less any accumulated impairment losses. It 
implies recognizing value gains in other comprehensive income (equity) and value 
losses in profit or loss, except in the event of reversals, in which case the 
subsequent gain or loss will be registered in the same place as the previous value 
change.  
 
c) Liability recognition 
In order to comply with their commitments, firms must deliver an amount of emission 
rights equal to their produced emissions along the compliance period. The obligation to 
surrender rights must be initially recognized and subsequently measured in their financial 
statements. 
In general, two main accounting practices can be found related to the liability arising 
from the obligation to deliver allowances. Both rely on either the timing of the recognition 
and the measurement of the corresponding liability (Haupt & Ismer , 2011, p.9-10). 
A. Focusing on the recognition date, entities have the choice of recognizing the 
liability when granted allowances are received (on allocation date) or recorded as 
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the entity realizes gas emissions. The latter option is the main lead followed in 
practice and it is in line with IAS 37 which states that the liability does not exist until 
the obligating event (emissions realized) occurs (Deloitte, n.d). 
B. With respect to the liability measurement there are two methods in order to 
measure the offsetting liability: the fair value approach and the cost of settlement 
approach.  
 
1. The fair value approach implies the liability measurement at present market 
value (fair value) for all allowances required to be surrendered. It also means 
that the provision has to be measured regardless of any allowances owned 
(granted or purchased). The main weakness of this approach is that there are 
some income gaps under the revaluation model because an increase in the 
allowances’ price results in higher expenses in profit and loss while any 
revaluation gain of allowances are recognized in other comprehensive income. 
So, this treatment gives rise to a net loss in the compliance period 
 
2. Under the cost of settlement approach the liability is measured at the carrying 
value of any allowances held. The primary expenses and derived obligation are 
valued according to allocated rights and the rest of the liability will be measured 
by reference to the amounts recorded for extra rights purchased to cover the 
emissions. Moreover, if the emissions at the year end exceed those which can 
be settled with the total amount of allowances held, an additional liability shall be 
recognized at the best possible estimation of the cost to cover the shortfall in 
allowances. This projected cost will be usually be determined by the present 
value of rights. Therefore the liability valuation will depend on the chosen 
approach to measure allowances. 
i. If allowances are measured under the net liability approach, granted rights 
are valued at nil cost, hence the liability will not be recognized until the 
emission exceeds the allocated rights held and the entity must purchase 
added rights, that will usually be valued at market prices. 
ii. On the other hand, if an entity uses the government grant approach, the 
expenses and the corresponding liability are recognized as the entity emits 
GHG, with reference to the book value of allocated rights (their market price 
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on allocation date) and also at fair value of the added purchased rights. In 
this case, it is common that the expenses will be offset by the income 
allocated  in profit and loss for the systematic derecognision of the 
government grant as emissions are made. 
According to Lovell et al. (2010)  the analysis of the different accounting practices that 
firms carry out under the EU ETS lead to two main conclusions: 
On the one hand, the variety of practices go to show that none of them are in line with 
any existing IFRS and most of them results in an income volatility and several mismatches. 
On the other hand, these current practices are not providing the accurate information that 
investors and other stakeholders need to assess the firm commitments toward their 
objectives of emission reductions. What stands out is that an urgent need of common 
accounting standards exists  that allow comparability of financial statements and provide a 
reasoned treatment of allowances which avoid income volatilities and offer a true and fair 
view of financial statements . 
An overview of the different approaches outlined in this section about how ETS 
participants particularly account for their EA on the basis of the existing international 
standards can be seen in Appendix B. 
 
10. Conclusion 
The present growing concern of climate change explains the creation of emission 
trading systems as the most common market mechanism to limit GHG emissions, one of 
the pollution business activities that causes large social and environmental impact. We 
must remember that GHGs are responsible for spreading the greenhouse effect, and can 
potentially lead the planet to dangerous climate change.  
In this respect, the cap and trade systems make emission allowances a production 
cost of participating entities and they acquire value as business rights which are able to 
bring firms significant benefits. Thus, ETS allows a price to be put on gas emissions and 
encourages their reduction by emitting and allocating a limited amount of tradable 
emission rights. 
As we can see, these flexibility mechanisms turn greenhouse gases into marketable 
products, but far from being innocuous, they can have negative impacts. In this way, they 
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allow industrialized countries to buy extra rights to pollute without having to meet their 
commitment with the Kyoto Protocol. This strengthens existing inequalities between 
developed and developing countries regarding the use of the atmosphere and natural 
resources flexibility mechanisms. All low price credits will be held in the hands of 
developed countries and when the time arrives for developing countries to reduce their 
own emissions, they will only have access  to more expensive options. Thus, industrialized 
nations and their entities are able to further increase their emissions allowances by 
damaging the interest of undeveloped countries in these rights.  
The analysis regarding accounting for greenhouse gases provides valuable evidence 
for the complexity of classifying and standardizing the new problems and the impact 
arising from climate change which has resulted in a lack of homogeneity. In this regard, 
international accounting standards have demonstrated their ability to avoid accounting 
diversity and protect the stakeholder`s interests. For this reason, it is widely assumed that 
accounting harmonization is the best method to eliminate the clear diversity on accounting 
for emission rights. The main reason for this assertion is because a common standard 
regarding emission allowances would allow all emitting firms to account for this particular 
asset in the same way. These concerns lead to the consideration of the main regulatory 
efforts to harmonize accounting practices across countries.  
However, despite these efforts there is still a lack of accounting guidance for trading 
schemes and while no specific international guidance or standard is issued by the IASB, 
companies participating in an ETS as well as all entities that produce GHG emissions, will 
have the flexibility to choose their appropriate accounting method for emission rights as 
long as it is compliant with  IFRS. Even though there has been a strong trend towards the 
adoption of the net liability method in Europe, the application of different approaches to 
date has resulted in divergence in accounting practice which, among many other related 
problems, undermines the comparability of financial statements between nations and 
makes the stakeholders’ management and decision- making harder.  
This paper leads us to conclude that the lack of clear evidence about the specific 
nature of emission rights as well as the insufficient understanding about this asset, makes 
it difficult to create a single guideline or accounting standard which can be commonly used 
by different firms and countries in a effective way. This complexity is mainly explained by 
the possible classifications of EA depending on the use,  as well as on the culture, and 
derived GAAP existing in each country. These differences between countries make it 
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difficult for EA to be accounted for by all gas emitters in the same way, thus giving rise to 
the analyzed diversity problem. This is reflected in the different accounting practices 
suggested by the main international and regional organisms (IFRS, FERC, ICAC). In 
addition,  this lack of uniformity is also evidenced by the variety of accounting practices of 
ETS participants regarding EA. These different approaches result from the voluntary 
application of existing IFRS principles related to the topic. 
However, the strong effect of these assets in firms’ financial statements make it 
necessary to overcome all these existing obstacles to achieve an international standard 
that clearly underlines appropriate accounting for emission allowances, and which allows a 
uniform treatment of rights, a lower diversity and an easier comparability by promoting a 
consistent basis for financial reporting. 
Taking into account the significant impact of the accounting method adopted in firm’s 
financial reports, the findings of this research provide useful information to policy makers, 
accounting standard setting bodies, investors, regulators, lenders and companies willing to 
participate in the ETS. In addition, these results can also be of interest to educators and 
researchers who can obtain a good insight into how current accounting for emission is 
developed. Future research is needed based on a statistical analysis of a representative 
sample of various entities` annual reports in order to generalize some results about their 
main accounting practices on emission rights. This future research could be realized on a 
specific sample of companies participating in UE ETS as well as through a selection of 
several companies participating in other ETS with the goal to find differences on EA 
accounting regarding diverse emission schemes across countries. Furthermore a 
complementary analysis might include surveys in order to clearly understand the reasons 
why each analyzed entity is conducting its EA accounting in a specific way. 
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12. Appendices 
Appendix A 
Summary comparison of changes in Spanish guidelines for EA accounting as Intangible 
Assets (Production model) 1 
 
 ICAC 2006 ICAC 2013 
A
ll
o
c
a
te
d
  
a
ll
o
w
a
n
c
e
s
 
Measured at market price on allocation date.  
Recognition of a government grant with 
systematic de-recognition in income as 
emissions are made. 
Measured at market price on allocation date.  
An Income is recorded directly in equity with 
systematic de-recognition in income as 
emissions are made. 
CREDIT DEBIT CREDIT DEBIT 
Intangible assets  
(216) “Derechos 
de emisión de 
GEI”. 
Government Grant 
(130)“Subvenciones 
Oficiales de Capital” 
Intangible assets  
(20X) “Derechos 
de emisión de 
GEI”. 
Income directly in 
Equity 
(940)“ Ingresos de 
Subvenciones 
Oficiales de Capital” 
P
u
rc
h
a
s
e
d
 
A
ll
o
w
a
n
c
e
s
 
Recognized at acquisition cost (with selling expenses) by the total amount paid or debited. 
CREDIT DEBIT CREDIT DEBIT 
Intangible assets 
(216) “Derechos 
de emisión de 
GEI”. 
 Debit account 
(57X) 
Intangible assets 
(20X) “Derechos 
de emisión de 
GEI”. 
Debit account 
(57X) 
Im
p
a
ir
m
e
n
t 
Allowances carried at more than their 
recoverable value must be recognized as a 
provision with the derived expense in profit and 
loss. The provision will be eliminated when its 
cause disappears or allowances will be 
surrendered or cancelled. 
An impairment loss has to be recognized as an 
expense in the income statement for allowances 
carried at more than their recoverable value. 
Allowances cannot be revalued according to the general principles of Spanish regulation.  
CREDIT DEBIT CREDIT DEBIT 
Expense in Profit 
and Loss statement 
(691)”Dotación a 
la provisión por 
depreciación del 
II3”. 
Provision 
(291) “Provisión por 
depreciación del II”. 
Expense in Profit 
and Loss statement 
(670) “Pérdida por 
deterioro del II” 
Impairment loss 
(290) “Deterioro de 
valor del II” 
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Appendix A (continued) 
 
 ICAC 2006 ICAC 2013 
L
ia
b
il
it
y
 a
n
d
 e
x
p
e
n
s
e
 r
e
c
o
g
n
it
io
n
: 
A
c
tu
a
l 
e
m
is
s
io
n
s
 
The expenses and the subsequent liability are recognized at the year- end as annual emissions 
are verified. 
 These two items are valued applying a FIFO valuation for the allocated allowances and then at 
the average cost of rights purchased. If the verified emissions are higher than the rights held, the 
liability will be also measured at the best estimation of rights that must be purchased to cover total 
emissions. 
The provision as well as the intangible assets will be cancelled when the firm has to settle the 
obligation by delivering the allowances in the next accounting year. 
CREDIT DEBIT CREDIT DEBIT 
Profit and loss 
expense  
(658) “Gastos por 
emisión de GEI” 
Liability
2 
(149) “Provisión por 
derechos de emisión 
de GEI” 
Profit and loss 
expense  
(65X) “Gastos por 
emisión de GEI” 
Liability 
(529X) “Provisión c/p 
por derechos de 
emisión de GEI” 
In
c
o
m
e
 r
e
c
o
g
n
it
io
n
: 
G
ra
n
t 
The government grant has to be systematically 
de-recognized in profit and loss as emissions 
associated with the granted allowances are 
realized and verified. 
The income recognized directly in equity will be 
subsequently recognized as income as 
emissions are made and expenses associated 
with granted allowances are recorded. 
CREDIT DEBIT CREDIT DEBIT 
Government Grant 
(130)”Subvencion
es Oficiales de 
Capital”  
Income in profit and 
loss 
(775)”Subvenciones 
de capital trasladadas 
al resultado del 
ejercicio” 
Transfer account 
(840) 
“Transferencia de 
Subvenciones 
Oficiales de 
Capital”. 
Income in profit and loss 
(746) “Subvenciones, 
donaciones y legados 
transferidos al 
resultado”. 
Income 
Regularization  
 (940)“ Ingresos de 
Subvenciones 
Oficiales de 
Capital” 
Transfer account 
(840) “Transferencia de 
Subvenciones 
Oficiales de Capital”. 
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Appendix A (continued) 
 
 ICAC 2006 ICAC 2013 
S
a
le
 o
f 
a
ll
o
w
a
n
c
e
s
 
In the next compliance period the entity can sell their surplus allowances on the market. This sale 
will generate losses or profits from intangible assets for the difference between their book value 
and the amount received less costs to sell. 
CREDIT DEBIT CREDIT DEBIT 
Credit account 
(amount received) 
Intangible assets  
(216) “Derechos de 
emisión de GEI”. 
Credit account 
(amount received) 
Intangible assets  
(20X) “Derechos de 
emisión de GEI”. 
Expense 
(670) “Pérdidas 
procedentes del 
II” 
Income 
(770) “Beneficios 
procedentes del II” 
Expense 
(670) “Pérdidas 
procedentes del II” 
Income 
(770) “Beneficios 
procedentes del II” 
D
e
li
v
e
ry
 o
f 
a
ll
o
w
a
n
c
e
s
 
In the next compliance period allowances have to be delivered to the government to fulfill the 
obligation for the emissions realized. It implies derecognizing the provision as well as the 
allowances. 
CREDIT DEBIT CREDIT DEBIT 
Liability
 
(149) “Provisión 
por derechos de 
emisión de GEI” 
Intangible assets  
(216) “Derechos de 
emisión de GEI”. 
Liability 
(529X) “Provisión 
c/p por derechos de 
emisión de GEI” 
Intangible assets  
(20X) “Derechos de 
emisión de GEI”. 
 
1. It should be recalled that the latter 2013 ICAC Resolution assumes a different allowances 
classification depending on the business model and their intended use by the firms. So, apart from 
the consideration as intangible assets (production purposes) if  rights are used for trading 
purposes  will be accounted for as  Inventories and if they are future contracts to buy or sell rights 
their accounting treatment will be the same as Financial Instruments 
2. In the ICAC 2006 resolution the provision is measured at short-term and in the 2013 resolution the 
provision is at large –term. 
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Appendix B 
Different accounting practices for EA into the EU ETS under the existing IFRS framework. 
EMISSION ALLOWANCES 
IN
IT
IA
L
 R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 
NET LIABILITY 
APPROACH 
Free allocated allowances Purchased allowances 
-Nominal amount (Nil) 
So, liability is only recognized 
once emissions are larger than 
allocated rights. 
-Acquisition cost 
GOVERNMENT 
GRANT APPROACH 
-Fair Value (the present market 
price at the allocation date). 
Liability is recognized regardless 
of the type of allowances owned 
S
U
B
S
E
Q
U
E
N
T
 M
E
A
S
U
R
E
M
E
N
T
 
 
COST MODEL 
- Book Value measurement (depending on Net Liability or 
Government grant approach) less any accumulated 
impairment losses. 
- Potential value gains are not reflected. 
- Recognition of Impairment losses. 
REVALUATION 
MODEL 
 
 
-Allowance revaluation according to market value less any 
accumulated impairment losses. 
-Value gains are recognized in equity and value losses in 
income (except reversals :possible change recognized in the 
same place as the previous). 
GOVERNMENT GRANT 
IN
IT
IA
L
 R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 
A
N
D
 S
U
B
S
E
Q
U
E
N
T
 
M
E
A
S
U
R
E
M
E
N
T
 
ONLY UNDER THE 
GOVERNMENT 
GRANT APPROACH  
(Granted 
allowances 
recorded at fair 
value) 
- Government grant recognition as a deferred income with a 
systematic de-recognition in profit and loss over the compliance 
period as emissions are made. 
- Recorded amount for the difference between the fair value of 
the allocated rights and the price paid or them. 
-Subsequent valuation: only impairment and reversal of a 
previous impairment 
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Appendix B (continued) 
OFFSETTING LIABILITY 
T
IM
IN
G
 
R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 
ALLOCATION DATE 
-Liability recognition when granted allowances are received (on 
allocation date). 
AS THE ENTITY 
EMITS 
-Liability is recorded as the entity realizes gases emissions 
In line with IAS 37 (liability does not exist until the 
obligating event occurs). 
L
IA
B
IL
IT
Y
 M
E
A
S
U
R
E
M
E
N
T
 
FAIR VALUE 
APPROACH 
- Liability valuation at present market value (fair value) for all 
allowances required to be surrendered. 
Drawbacks: there are income gaps under the revaluation 
model since value gains are recorded in OCI and the 
increase on rights price results in higher expenses. 
COST OF 
SETTLEMENT 
APPROACH 
The liability is measured at the carrying value of any allowances 
held 
- Primary expenses and liability measured by allocated 
rights 
- The remainder liability measured in line with extra rights 
purchased to cover the emissions 
- Additional liability recognized at the best estimate of the 
expenditure required to cover the shortfall in allowances 
and settle the obligation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
